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THE INTER-EXECUTIVE ACTIVITY OF MINISTERIAL POLICY  
ADVISERS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 
 
R. Paul Wilson 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Ministerial political staffers are frequently discussed with respect to their “vertical” activities 
within the traditional bilateral relationship between ministers and permanent public servants and, 
in particular, whether, as contributors to "new political governance" (Aucoin 2012), they further 
public service politicization (Benoit 2006; Eichbaum and Shaw 2007a, 2007b; Tiernan 2007; 
Wilson 2016).  However, while their relationship with the public service is important, it is not 
the whole story.  Power within Westminster systems of government flows across a complex web 
of relationships in and around the core executive (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990; Rhodes 1995).  
Because of their shared political affinity and personal ties with ministers, political staffers are 
well placed to exercise influence within multiple networks that criss-cross government and 
politics. (Craft 2016; Gains and Stoker 2011; Eichbaum and Shaw 2010; Rhodes and Tiernan 
2014; Yong and Hazell 2014; Zussman 2009). Examining this “horizontal” dimension 
(Connaughton 2010; Craft 2016: Maley 2000, 2011) illuminates the mechanisms of co-
ordination and information transmission on the political side and provides insight into how 
decisions are shaped within the black box of ministerial offices.   
It has long been recognized that political staffers actively work across departmental 
boundaries.  For example, Lenoski observed how, under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, "the 
political staff network contributes to the reinforcement of the solidarity in which, to survive, 
collective ministerial responsibility has to be firmly rooted" (1977, 172).  Bakvis (1997, 119) 
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recognized how staffers act "...as a primary node in a network or more likely a number of 
networks of specialist advisers and contacts, channelling critical information to the key decision 
maker, the minister."  However, Maria Maley first systematically documented this aspect of 
political policy staffers' work and identified distinctive policy roles which were "important in 
shaping policy outcomes" and which depended on advisers' privileged involvement "in a 
minister's overlapping relationships with other policy actors and [as] conduits for information 
within these relationships" (2000, 467-8).  She further elaborated on the importance of 
ministerial staffers' informal networks and relationships which provide a vehicle for political and 
policy co-ordination across government (Maley 2011, 1484). 
 Other researchers identify similar themes.  In New Zealand, Eichbaum and Shaw (2011, 
596 ) find that staffers are "key actors" in core executive networks, connecting on behalf of their 
ministers across a range of executive relationships, brokering policy agreements and negotiating 
with legislators in the context of minority governments resulting from proportional 
representation.  Connaughton (2010, 362-3) concludes that political policy advisers in the 
Republic of Ireland have "significant" duties on "cross-cutting issues that transcend departmental 
boundaries and include consensus building in complex policy networks". Jonathan Craft (2016) 
provides the fullest analysis of partisan policy advisers in Canada.  He documents how they 
provide substantive and procedural brokerage and co-ordination across government, not only in 
first ministers' offices but throughout the executive, and uses this framework "to move beyond 
country-specific accounts...toward a more comparatively generalizable framework" applicable 
across and even outside the Westminster family (Craft 2015a, 136-7).   
 Such a broad perspective is necessary for theorizing the role of political staff in executive 
government, but must have a solid empirical foundation.  Through evidence from a 2013 survey 
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as well as elite interviews, this chapter confirms the trajectory of recent literature, namely that 
political staffers use their networks of relationships to impact the policy process, through 
analysing the horizontal policy activity of ministerial policy advisers in Canada under the 
government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper (2006-2015).  Due to space constraints, it 
considers only relationships within the executive and parliamentary contexts and not those with 
outside stakeholders.  Emphasis is given to the "'deep structures'" (Connaughton 2010, 366) of 
co-ordination and discussion between Canadian ministerial offices which augment and facilitate 
advisers' more relationship-based networking, and to the significance of such practices for policy 
development.    
 
Methodology 
Using the Government of Canada's online Electronic Directory Services (GEDS) a total of 64 
individuals were identified who served as senior level ministerial political policy advisers (in all 
but a few instances with the title of either director of policy or senior policy adviser) at some 
point during the period from October 2012 to June 2013.1   These 64 staffers were invited by 
email to participate in a survey which consisted of both forced response and open-ended 
questions.   Thirty-four responses were received back from individuals employed in a wide range 
of ministerial offices, including at central agencies, the Prime Minister's Office and the offices of 
ministers of state.  The final survey response rate was 53 percent.  Survey data were augmented 
by elite interviews (and one email exchange) with the following: 14 current (at the time) or 
former Conservative political staffers who had served under the Harper government; two 
Chrétien-era Liberal staffers; one long-serving deputy minister; and a currently-serving senior 
adviser from Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's office.  The analysis also reflects the experience of 
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the author, who served as director of policy in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) from 2009 to 
2011 and in the offices of three other federal ministers from 2006 to 2009.     
 
 
Political Staffers: The Canadian Context 
 
Contextually, it is important to stress from the outset that ministerial political staffers are a 
comparatively numerous group in Canada (Yong and Hazell 2014, 152).  Appointed under 
section 128 of the Public Service Employment Act they are formally known as "exempt staff" 
because they are exempt from the usual public service rules for competitive hiring and non-
partisanship.  Hired directly by the minister, they serve at his or her pleasure and explicitly 
support the government's political agenda.  As context for the period under consideration in this 
study, there were in total 558 full-time exempt staffers across the Canadian government on 
March 31, 2013 (Dawson 2013, 5).  Ministerial policy advisers, a prominent species of the 
broader taxonomic genus of exempt staff, comprised about 20 percent of the entire ministerial 
staff community (Wilson 2015b).   
 The Privy Council Office (PCO) states that the raison d'être for ministerial exempt staff 
"is to provide Ministers with advisors and assistants who are not departmental public servants, 
who share their political commitment, and who can complement the professional, expert and 
non-partisan advice and support of the public service," and recognizes that this involves 
horizontal "liaising with other Ministers’ offices and caucus" (Canada, Privy Council Office 
2015, 46).  In setting out generic job descriptions for staffers, the 2011 Treasury Board Policy 
for Ministers' Offices establishes that, among other things, a minister's director of policy "needs 
to work closely with the Prime Minister's Office and other ministers' offices in order to co-
ordinate the development of policies and programs within the government" (Canada, Treasury 
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Board 2011, 66).  The horizontal themes of co-ordination and networking with other ministerial 
offices, including PMO, are again clearly emphasized.  These also emerge as prominent features 
from the survey. 
 
INTRA-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS: SURVEY FINDINGS 
How Advisers See Their Role 
When asked what skills advisers felt were "most useful" to their position, the relational aspects 
of the job figured prominently.  As Table 1 shows, 42% of respondents mentioned the 
importance of “interpersonal skill/relationship building/listening to others/respect.”  This was 
tied as the top response along with strong written communication skill.  The latter reflects the 
strong—and perhaps idiosyncratic—culture of documented political advice characteristic of the 
Harper PMO and many ministers’ offices (Craft 2016, 58; Wilson 2016 forthcoming).  But the 
former demonstrates that staffers prize these relational skills well above other characteristics that 
might be commonly expected in a political policy role such as: political judgment (mentioned by 
29% of respondents), political analysis (16%) and policy portfolio knowledge (13%).  A further 
relationally-oriented category of “teamwork/networking” was also mentioned by 13 percent of 
respondents.   This high emphasis upon interpersonal skill suggests that advisers recognize the 
importance of relationship building for their policy advisory work. 
 Table 2 lists the top 10 ways in which survey respondents described their job.  
Unsurprisingly, policy advisers most commonly say that they advise the minister with respect to 
policy (58%) and politics (48%).  But, given how so much attention is devoted to the relationship 
of political staff with public servants, it is noteworthy that meeting/working with officials (36%) 
ranks in fourth place, tied with the notion of collaborating and networking with other ministerial 
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offices, including PMO (36%).  Respondents also recognize the importance of implementing and 
ensuring congruence with the government's policy objectives (26%) and co-ordinating and 
managing the policy and cabinet process (19%), both functions which could apply to working 
with departmental officials (vertical) and across political networks (horizontal).   
Table 1-Most Useful Skills 
"What do you feel are the most useful skills for someone in your position?" (Top grouped 
responses by percentage of cases mentioned). 
 
Rank Response % 
1 Strong communications – writing 42 
1 Interpersonal skill/ relationship building/ listen to others/ respect 42 
3 Analyse/synthesize large amounts of information/ multiple issues 32 
4 Political judgment 29 
5 Time management/ work well under pressure/ remain calm 26 
6 Knowledge of institutions/government/electoral systems 19 
7 Strong communications – oral 16 
7 Knowledge of politics/political context 16 
7 Political analysis 16 
10 Teamwork/networking 13 
10 Portfolio/policy field knowledge 13 
 
 
 
Table 2-How Policy Advisers Describe their Job 
"In one paragraph, please describe your job" (top 10 grouped responses by percentage of cases 
mentioned). 
 
Rank Response % 
1 Advise minister – policy 58 
2 Advise minister – politics 48 
3 Manage/work with stakeholders 39 
4 Meet/work with officials 36 
4 Collaborate/network with other ministerial offices, including PMO 36 
6 Implement/ensure congruence with government policy objectives 26 
7 Supervise/manage staff/assist Chief of Staff 23 
8 Co-ordinate/manage policy/cabinet process 19 
8 Oversee/challenge/monitor departmental policy/admin 19 
10 Support/assist/defend minister 16 
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One adviser clearly articulated how different aspects of horizontal relationship- building 
come together in practice:  “My job is to make the Minister look good.  My colleagues are 
focused on him looking good in the media or in parliament - my role is more general in that he 
needs to have politically consistent policy content to discuss in those contexts and others.  So, 
my job is to take the overarching narrative of the Government and apply it to items within my 
Minister's portfolio.  I help him make decisions within this context.  I help him make 
relationships.  I help him speak to stakeholders, caucus, and cabinet in this context.  I help him 
achieve his personal goals.  I help him avoid problems and pursue successes" (Survey respondent 
19).  This sums up the horizontal dimension: developing relationships inside the executive 
(cabinet) and outside (stakeholders, parliamentary caucus) in order to advance the minister’s 
policy agenda. 
 
Relations With Other Ministers 
Policy staffers who work for one minister do not as a rule interact deeply with other ministers.  
As Table 3 shows, 50 percent of policy advisers will “occasionally” attend meetings between 
their own minister and other ministers, but only 6 percent will actively participate either very 
frequently (3%) or frequently (3%) in those meetings.  It is even more uncommon for them to 
represent their own minister at meetings with other ministers: 9 percent did so occasionally, and 
only 3 percent did so very frequently.  It was somewhat more common for them to mobilize 
support for their own minister’s policies among other ministers, presumably on an informal 
basis: 25 percent did this either very frequently (9%) or frequently (16%), with a further 22 
percent doing so occasionally.  One adviser described how he regularly dealt with another 
political office on a joint file.  “I actually got [name of policy adviser] to get me ten minutes to 
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brief [name of minister] on [topic of legislation under consideration] before officials got to 
him…. Once that relationship had been cultivated, the implementation of the [file] agenda 
moved much more smoothly” (adviser 9).  Such meetings happened, though they were not 
typical. 
Table 3-Interaction with Cabinet and Other Ministerial Offices 
 
"Thinking of your own work as a policy adviser in a minister's office, please rank the following 
activities on a scale of 1 to 5 according to how often you would engage in the activity, where 1 
means 'very frequently,' 2 means 'frequently,' 3 means 'occasionally,' 4 means 'rarely,' and 5 
means 'never.'"* 
 Respondents (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 Attend meetings between minister and other ministers 9 25 50 16 0 
2 Actively participate in meetings between minister and other 
ministers 
3 3 61 27 6 
3 Represent your minister at meetings with other ministers 3 0 9 50 38 
4 Attend cabinet meetings (including cabinet committees) 22 9 41 19 9 
5 Meet with political staff from PMO (non PMO only) 36 39 21 4 0 
6 Meet informally with staff from other minister's offices 30 30 30 9 0 
7 Mobilize support for your minister's policies among other ministers 9 16 22 38 16 
8 Mobilize support for your minister's policies among political staff 
from other minister's offices 
25 41 25 6 3 
 
*Questions taken or adapted from Eichbaum and Shaw 2007, 99 and/or Eichbaum and Shaw 
2011, 587). 
 
 
Attending Cabinet 
PMO staffers have traditionally monitored and attended cabinet committee meetings (Campbell 
1987, 130; Goldenberg 2006, 110) but until recently advisers to other ministers have not done so.  
This reduced their policy influence and placed them at a distinct disadvantage not only compared 
to PMO but also to senior departmental officials who either attend cabinet or will be debriefed by 
those who do (Savoie 1983, 518).  The traditional rules for attendance continued in the early 
Harper years: advisers from PMO would attend cabinet committees and might (or might not) 
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provide political feedback to the ministerial staffers who were working on a file.  Later on, 
however, PMO instructed PCO to permit ministers presenting items at cabinet committees to 
bring one political staffer (often but not necessarily a policy adviser) into the room to listen to 
the discussion (Canada. Privy Council Office 2012, 19).  This practice is reflected in the survey.  
As Table 3 shows, 72 percent of respondents attend cabinet meetings at least occasionally.  Such 
access permits the ministerial staffer involved on the file to hear the political discussion among 
ministers which is vital when follow-up policy work is required.     
 
Working with Members of Parliament 
 
According to Eichbaum and Shaw (2007c, 99-100), political advisers in New Zealand have an 
important role in working with Members of Parliament. They found that 88 percent of advisers at 
least occasionally had meetings with members of the government’s parliamentary caucus (50% 
did so frequently or very frequently), and that 78 percent also met with MPs or advisers from 
other political parties (45% did so frequently or very frequently).  Advisers in Ottawa also 
interact with MPs from the government caucus, although less often than those in Wellington.  
According to the survey (Table 4), 72 percent of Canadian policy advisers at least occasionally 
accompany their minister to meetings with caucus colleagues (30% frequently or very 
frequently) and 60 percent actively participated in such meetings (27% frequently or very 
frequently).  This would include their role supporting Minister's Caucus Advisory Committees 
which Prime Minister Harper instituted to obtain input from backbench government MPs into 
policy proposals (Wilson 2015a, 236).  Indeed, 72% of Canadian advisers at least occasionally 
meet government MPs without the minister being present, although only 21% do so frequently or 
very frequently.  But meeting with MPs or staff from other political parties is much less common 
in Canada than in New Zealand, with only 22 percent of survey respondents doing so 
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occasionally.  Perhaps this difference in approach is due to the challenge of governing with 
multi-party coalitions under New Zealand’s system of proportional representation (Eichbaum 
and Shaw 2007a, 463).  Or perhaps MP liaison including cross-party contact in Canada is, given 
role differentiation among political staffers, led by political staffers other than policy advisers 
(for example, parliamentary affairs advisers).   
  
Table 4- Activity with MPs 
 
"Thinking of your own work as a policy adviser in a minister's office, please rank the following 
activities on a scale of 1 to 5 according to how often you would engage in the activity, where 1 
means 'very frequently,' 2 means 'frequently,' 3 means 'occasionally,' 4 means 'rarely,' and 5 
means 'never.'"* 
 
 Respondents (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 Accompany minister to meetings with caucus colleagues 9 21 42 24 3 
2 Actively participate in meetings between minister and caucus 
colleagues 
9 18 33 30 9 
3 Meet with members of the government caucus without minister 6 15 51 24 3 
4 Meet with MPs or staff from other parties 0 0 22 50 28 
 
*Questions taken or adapted from Eichbaum and Shaw 2007, 99 and/or Eichbaum and Shaw 
2011, 587). 
 
 
Working with Other Ministerial Offices 
 
Not surprisingly, given how they view it as intrinsic to their job description, policy advisers 
report high levels of interaction with other ministerial offices.  As shown in Table 3 above, 60% 
of respondents meet either very frequently (30%) or frequently (30%) on an informal basis with 
staff from other ministerial offices.  Meeting with political staff from the Prime Minister’s Office 
is even more common, with 75% of (non-PMO) policy advisers doing this very frequently (36%) 
or frequently (39%).  This level of engagement with other political offices is expected based on 
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practice elsewhere.  For example, Eichbaum and Shaw (2007c, 99) found that policy advisers in 
New Zealand met frequently or very frequently with both other ministerial advisers (78%) and 
with PMO (69%), while Connaughton (2010, 359) observed a similar pattern in Ireland (72% 
and 64% respectively).  
 Advisers consider good relationships across political networks to be "very 
important...because you never know when you'll need them.  And offices don't do enough of 
this" (adviser 7).  Adviser 11 explained how relationships gave him a conduit for discussions 
with other political staffers:  "You got to know people in other ministers’ offices because the 
idea was then if there’s anything your boss ever needed from that other office you had somebody 
you knew who you could call there.  Even if it wasn’t their direct responsibility, they’d say to 
you ‘that’s so and so, call them and tell them I said you should call them.’  And you could very 
quickly find out who the right person was and get into a discussion with them.  So knowing 
people across government was quite helpful.”  
 Such connections could be valuable for different reasons.  In order to fully brief their own 
ministers, advisers might need either substantive information on a proposal or political 
intelligence on how their own proposal is being received.  One former PMO policy adviser 
observed how frequently presenting ministers were surprised at Cabinet by other ministers' 
questions, and concluded “This is their staff's fault."  (Adviser 7)   Advisers do not only convey 
information.  They are also active in mobilizing political support for their ministers' policies.  
Sometimes, as shown in Table 3, they do so with other ministers directly: 25 percent do so very 
frequently (9%) or frequently (16%), although this is notably less often than in New Zealand 
where 41 percent do so very frequently (19%) or frequently (22%) (Eichbaum and Shaw 2011, 
593).  On the other hand, Canadian staffers are more likely to mobilize support for their 
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ministers' policies among other advisers to other ministers.  In Canada, 66 percent of policy 
staffers do so very frequently (25%) or frequently (41%), while only 9 percent do so rarely (6%) 
or never (3%).  In New Zealand, by contrast, only 37 percent do so frequently/very frequently 
and 44 percent rarely/never (Eichbaum and Shaw 2011, 593).   
 Maley describes how Australian advisers have become the "executive-level negotiators 
within government" and hold delegated authority (if informally) from ministers to negotiate 
policy positions with other political offices in the expectation of ministers' approval (2000, 463).  
In Canada the mobilization function certainly involves political discussions between ministers’ 
offices in response to disagreement between officials.  As one adviser explained: "If departments 
had differing views then [political] staff needed to talk stuff out to resolve.  Staff would negotiate 
and could work horizontally to develop a common position to present to their ministers which 
might hope to overcome the department gridlock."  Another adviser was blunter: “We did the 
behind the scenes work below when the civil service would not listen….I would call it an end 
run around the civil service” (Adviser 3).   
 A former chief of staff explained that, on high level matters of conscience and general 
principle, ministers “were very much their own chief interlocutors.  But, as issues descended into 
complexity, extreme levels of detail, and protracted discussion or conflict, ministers delegated 
more and more authority to issue area experts on the political staff” (Adviser 10).  A PMO policy 
adviser agreed and talked about meetings “to try and bridge the gap and come to a consensus” 
(Adviser 7).  Ministers simply could not dedicate the time needed to work through the minute 
details on a single file.  Further, using staff for such “proxy conflicts” allowed ministers to act as 
“nominal peacemakers to close the deal” once the details had been thoroughly debated (Adviser 
10).  But, he explained, in such cases he always worked within the negotiating parameters set by 
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the minister in advance.  Further, “humility and vigilance were key” so that he always delineated 
his minister’s express views from his own.  Staffers who had a “very strong track record of 
anticipating the minister’s views and wishes correctly” had strong currency and would be treated, 
by officials and other offices, as a “direct proxy for the minister.”  But the key was “never to 
overstep” since doing so even once seriously undermined a staffer’s reputation (Adviser 10).   
 Do negotiations become political horse-trading?  Adviser 10 describes how, 
“shamefully,” he once committed to have the minister commission a study in his department in 
exchange for support from another minister for action on an unrelated but regionally significant 
file.  “Not my finest moment,” he conceded, “but my minister was in extremis” (adviser 10).  
Another former staffer who had worked with several ministers and at PMO felt that such explicit 
bargaining was rare.  Nevertheless, he did recall a time when, in order to advance an important 
file in provincial negotiation, his minister needed support from other federal ministers and he 
was “deployed to represent our political master in discussions with another minister’s office” 
(adviser 13). While not typical, staffers are on occasion involved in such quid pro quo 
negotiations. 
 While it is open to all policy advisers to network on an informal basis, geography hinders 
this since ministerial offices in Ottawa are political enclaves isolated (symbolically and 
physically) within their departmental headquarters.  Consequently, ministerial staff have 
relatively easy access to public servants but must make a conscious effort to develop personal 
relationships with political colleagues.  On the other hand, technology—in particular, email and 
direct messaging with Blackberry BBM (the ubiquitous tool within government), including 
group BBM chats—permits instant communication between political offices.  But while informal 
networking has never been easier, not all advisers are equally well-placed to take advantage.  
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Some might lack the temperament or opportunity to make connections, while others might not 
succeed in escaping from their departmental officials' orbit.  Political staffers "work within their 
own stovepipes," observed one policy director.  It is possible to pick up the phone and work out 
issues directly with other ministerial offices or with PMO, "but I'm finding a lot of offices don't 
do this.  If you are entrepreneurial this can be very useful" (adviser 2).   
 
Cabinet Pre-Briefs 
In order to facilitate broader political engagement, the Harper PMO hosted formal meetings with 
senior policy advisers from all ministers’ offices.  The nature of these meetings evolved over 
time.  Soon after the Harper government was elected in 2006, the PMO director of policy, Mark 
Cameron, began to convene regular meetings on a monthly to semi-annual basis in order to 
discuss implementation of the government’s priorities and future agenda.  Some PMO policy 
advisers also held meetings for policy staffers from the ministerial offices within their areas of 
responsibility; these focused on broad discussion of emerging issues, not on specific cabinet 
agenda items, and were held on a similarly occasional basis—sometimes monthly or more, 
sometimes less frequently.   
 By 2009, PMO policy advisers had regularized a system of weekly "cabinet pre-briefs” 
which continued in more or less the same form until the government’s defeat in 2015.  A few 
days prior to the weekly meeting of most cabinet committees, the responsible PMO policy 
adviser would chair a meeting at PMO for the directors of policy representing each of the 
ministers on that committee.  The meetings had several purposes.  First, PMO was acting as a 
"social convenor" (adviser 7) in bringing advisers together regularly from across government and 
assisting them to build personal relationships.  Adviser 11, who (above) emphasized the 
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importance of personal relationships, recognized the importance of central convening, saying 
that "A good network of people across the government is very helpful.  The policy director 
meetings at PMO were valuable even just for that reason alone."  
 Second, the pre-briefs permitted detailed political consideration of items on the upcoming 
agenda of each cabinet committee.  Context is important.  In Canada, the Privy Council Office 
(PCO) acts as the secretariat for all cabinet and cabinet committee meetings (except for Treasury 
Board) and prior to a meeting will circulate the agenda as well as one or more binders containing 
the formal cabinet submissions for consideration as signed by the sponsoring minister(s).  At the 
time of the PMO pre-brief, ministers' staffers will usually have received and reviewed the 
materials (they are permitted to do so for most items); their ministers, however, likely will not 
yet have done so.  Instead, ministers will usually review the binder closer to the meeting, along 
with a political memo prepared by their own office staff with political context and advice. 
 The meetings, therefore, have several important functions.  They allow the lead office - 
whether the director of policy or the policy adviser working most closely on the file - to explain 
to the group his or her minister's policy position and political rationale.  This is an important 
opportunity for information transfer, especially complex background or technical details, as well 
as for mobilizing support and saying "Here's our proposal, and here's why we think it is the best 
option" (adviser 12).   Other advisers also have the opportunity to seek clarification in 
anticipation of writing briefing notes to their own ministers on the topic.  The meetings also 
provide political intelligence.  The presenting office will likely not hear the specific views of 
other ministers (who will not yet have read the proposal).  However, a room full of political staff 
is a useful political sounding-board; questions and challenges indicate possible weak points and 
allow the minister to shore up his or her argument.   
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 A senior PMO adviser lauded the pre-briefs, observing that "the efficiency of having 
everyone in the same room just can't be replicated" (adviser 12).  All offices receive the same 
information from the expert staffer on the file and heard the same political discussion at the same 
time.  Since all advisers would have to brief their own ministers in the next few days, the 
meetings helped them to prepare and lessen the time crunch.  While the meetings provided 
opportunity for PMO to provide instruction on policy files, this was not their usual purpose.  
From the PMO's perspective, “We could function quite nicely without [them]….This was about 
getting other ministers’ offices up to speed on the files” (adviser 12).   The relevant PMO policy 
adviser would have been in ongoing communication with the sponsoring office, and so would 
already know the lead minister's views.  Further, by this point the PMO would already have 
provided a memorandum to the prime minister with their view and sometimes received back his 
response.  If he provided direction, they could pass it on (adviser 12) but they did not need the 
pre-briefs to do this.   
 
 PMO and “Four Corners” Meetings 
While the cabinet pre-briefs may have been largely about information transmission for the 
benefit of other offices, another “deep structure” implemented under the Harper government, the 
“four corners” meeting, was very much (although not exclusively) for the benefit of the PMO.  
Involving departmental officials as well as other political offices, these meetings allowed the 
PMO to integrate vertical and horizontal networks in order to obtain expert information and exert 
central influence—if not sometimes direct control—over policy development in key areas.  Craft 
noted the existence of these meetings (2016, 190) but, thinking them “rare” (272), 
underestimated their significance.   
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 Normally in Canada the PMO advisers deal directly on a daily basis with PCO officials, 
but much less regularly with public servants in other departments.   For their part, departmental 
officials take their direction from their own minister, subject to co-ordination by the PCO, and 
not from the PMO.  This system has the advantage of clear lines of accountability, but there is 
also the potential for miscommunication.  Of course, the PMO and the minister’s office will try 
to maintain horizontal contact along political networks.  And individual PMO advisers may (and 
should) have personal networks across government, including with deputy ministers and other 
senior officials (Goldenberg 2006).  Sometimes, however, these are not sufficient.   
 In order to dialogue across the political-public service divide,  the PMO instituted "four 
corners" meetings at which PMO and PCO personnel could meet together in one room for 
briefing and discussion on a single issue with the relevant departmental officials and the 
appropriate staff from their minister’s office.  Usually these meetings involved policy issues, 
although the tool could also be used for communications or issues management purposes.  
Ministers themselves did not attend.     
 In an email, Guy Giorno, who served as chief of staff to Ontario Premier Mike Harris as 
well as to Prime Minister Harper, explained that he first instituted "four corners" meetings  in the 
Premier's Office at Queen's Park.  From there the concept--and the name--were imported by the 
Harper PMO; this occurred, as advisor 11 recalls, "after we'd been in government a few years."  
In an interview a deputy minister confirms that they were, federally at least, an “innovation” of 
the Harper administration.  “Absolutely.  Sure.  We never had four corners before.”  The 
innovation invited controversy. 
 From the PMO’s perspective—often shared by the minister’s office—the meetings were 
useful in three ways.  First, information transfer.  The meetings gave the PMO “access to the real 
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experts that we couldn’t speak with otherwise” (adviser 12) and allowed everyone to hear the 
same answers at the same time, rather than having the expert information filtered through non 
experts, whether in the minister’s office or at the PCO.  Second, as a ministerial adviser said, 
four corners meetings served to “get everyone on the same page” in terms of direction.   As he 
explained, “if ministerial staff wanted to drive forward on an issue but the public service had 
concerns,” then they could be put on the table and resolved (adviser 11).  Third, meetings helped 
to overcome delay.  As the same ministerial adviser explained, “if stuff was held up, then it was 
a good way to get an issue moving.  If a department was holding something up, then PMO could 
call the department in front of PCO who could then give them marching orders to get things 
going” (adviser 11).  A chief of staff agreed that four corners meetings helped to “break the 
power of the ‘telephone game’ and various delay tactics, which is why I like them so much” 
(adviser 10).  He added that in his experience “sometimes just suggesting a four corners can 
break the log jam.”  
 From these comments it is clear that four corner meetings were not just useful to the 
PMO but also to ministerial offices in some circumstances.  Meetings, however, did not always 
involve the two political offices ganging up on the public service.  Some configurations might 
have PMO and PCO on the same page seeking information and responsiveness from the 
department and minister’s office.     
 The downside of four corners meetings is the perception that the PMO could use them to 
issue direction to ministerial staff and to departmental officials, which only their own minister 
ought to do.  Thus, according to the deputy minister interviewed, they represent “an insidious 
intrusion into the proper chains of accountability,” potentially undermining ministers and their 
responsibility for actions taken in their departments. PMO policy advisers were conscious of this 
209 
 
 
problem.  One senior PMO policy adviser explained: “I tried to be very careful about never 
giving direction.  We weren’t authorized to give direction unless it came from the PM himself.  
And there were relatively few instances where that was the case.” (adviser 12). An experienced 
ministerial director of policy agreed that, from what he saw, the PMO did not use the meetings to 
give direction to departments or to minister’s offices.  Rather, the PMO used them to call both 
minister’s offices and departments “to the principal’s office” if they weren’t moving a file 
quickly enough, and he didn’t see this as inappropriate (adviser 11). 
 Whether because of these accountability concerns or, as a PMO adviser suggested, PCO’s 
fear that they were losing control of the information flow to PMO (adviser 12)—or a 
combination of both—at one point PCO sought to restrict four corners meetings to items on the 
main agenda of the Priorities and Planning committee of cabinet.  As a PMO senior adviser 
explained, the offices settled on a compromise whereby all requests for four corner meetings had 
to be submitted from the PMO chief of staff directly to the Clerk’s office, and could not be 
requested at lower levels.  “This was not a huge impediment,” the adviser explained, but “we 
thought more about whether we really needed one before submitting the request,” and 
presumably PCO felt somewhat more comfortable about how they were being used (adviser 12).   
 
Institutional Choices and Government Style 
Political offices everywhere are under the same pressures and so, quite independently, can 
develop similar solutions to similar problems.  Connaughton (2010, 365) notes that Irish policy 
advisers met on a weekly basis under the auspices of the first minister’s office to discuss the 
weekly cabinet agenda. This resembles the Harper PMO.  Sometimes practices are imported 
from elsewhere, just as four corners meetings derived from a previous Conservative government 
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in Ontario.  Structured and centrally co-ordinated meetings for political policy staff were not 
unique to the Harper government; but neither had they been a prominent feature of previous 
Canadian federal governments.  A former policy adviser under the Chrétien government recalls 
that, in her experience, structured meetings were rare, most conversations were ad hoc, and co-
ordination across offices and with PMO occurred “through more informal mechanisms where 
social capital and personal networks played a big role” (Adviser 14).  Eddie Goldenberg, long-
time senior policy adviser and later chief of staff to Prime Minister Chrétien, agrees.  “Before 
each [cabinet] committee there was nothing formal,” he explained in an interview.  “The 
Economic policy person would get the agenda and may talk it over with her counterpart in the 
minister’s office….But we didn’t have any of the so-called four corners meetings or anything 
like that.”  Different PMOs have different structures and processes depending on their style and 
needs.  The Harper PMO developed a higher than usual institutional formality in terms of 
horizontal co-ordination, in part as a way to focus on the government's political agenda in the 
uncertainty of a minority parliament but also as a way to develop political staff networks as a 
counterweight to the public service.  
 Early indications are that the still relatively new Liberal government of Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau (elected in October 2015) is maintaining some of the Harper government's 
practices in terms of central co-ordination.  According to a senior adviser in the Trudeau PMO, 
four corners meetings continue and are "seen as regular course of practice."  In cases where there 
is a "blockage or misunderstanding" they are "a way to get everyone around the table and 
identify what those issues are and solve them."  The adviser considers the tone of the meetings to 
be "pretty positive," and he believes that PCO is of the same view.  While the Trudeau PMO 
does not hold formal briefings on cabinet committee agenda items, the Trudeau adviser says that 
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PMO uses its "convening role" to hold a monthly meeting of ministerial policy directors in order 
to "co-operate and share best practices" and also to encourage "informal consultations" between 
offices.   
 As under all governments, the practices of the Trudeau PMO will evolve to meet its 
unique needs and operating style.  For example, reports indicate political staffers being recruited 
from the public service to a much greater extent than under the Conservatives (Shane 2016) as 
well as extensively from the Liberal provincial government in Ontario (Taber 2015).  The former  
practice will tend to create a different and less adversarial relationship between the political staff 
culture and officials; the latter means importing ready-made personal networks between advisers 
and suggests that perhaps the ministerial staff culture in Ottawa is more likely to resemble that 
under the provincial Liberal government at Queen’s Park than the federal Liberal government 
under Jean Chrétien.  The evolution of practice in the Trudeau government over time bears 
watching.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
While specifically examining a single point in time under the government of Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper, this analysis has revealed significant parallels in ministerial policy staffers' 
horizontal activities with documented practice elsewhere.  At the same time, however, it suggests 
caution with respect to generalization.  In important ways, practice in Canada differed under 
Harper from that under previous prime ministers; but there was even variation within the 
Conservatives' decade in power.  Many factors, including the prime minister's personal style, the 
parliamentary context, the overall government culture and its relationship with the public service, 
impact the role of ministers and therefore the role of ministerial staff.  While it can be predicted 
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that ministerial staff will use networks and relationships to pursue political goals, how they do so 
is very much context specific.   
 Advisers' political work is entirely appropriate for political staff supporting political 
decision-makers.  However, as this chapter has shown, it is double-edged.  With respect to the 
public service, by taking responsibility for supporting ministers with the political aspects of 
briefing and bargaining, policy staffers allow departmental officials to maintain an appropriate 
distance, thus reducing pressures towards inappropriate politicization.  However, exempt staff 
can complement but never replace the need for professional advice from public servants to 
ministers, and relying only on political networks in an attempt to "end run" deputy ministers 
should be resisted.  On the political side, the PMO has a positive role to play in facilitating 
relationships and information transfer between ministerial offices, and by co-ordinating 
discussions can strengthen the government's ability to pursue its agenda.  But while the prime 
minister may direct ministers, his office holds no such power; therefore the PMO must (without 
explicit warrant) resist using horizontal levers, whether formal or informal, to lord it over 
ministerial offices.  Nevertheless, political policy advisers play an essential role in supporting 
ministers and, in Canada as elsewhere, any account of cabinet decision-making is incomplete 
without recognizing their formal and informal inter-executive activity.
                                               
Endnote 
1 This is the third in a series of studies based on the same survey of ministerial policy staffers.  
The first established a demographic profile and examined their tenure in office (Wilson 2015b).  
The second considered staffers' "vertical" relationship with public servants (Wilson 2016). 
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